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Demographic Electoral Pressures in County-Level Immigration Enforcement Policymaking
(Under the Direction of Rahsaan Maxwell)
Using a novel dataset on county-level immigration enforcement policies in the US, I explore
the role of demography and political geography in local immigration enforcement
policymaking. I find evidence that local immigration enforcement policy becomes more
restrictive where Hispanic populations are large and visible, and that this restrictive effect
disappears when Hispanic populations are large enough. I also find that local political
dynamics are far stronger predictors of immigration enforcement policies. My results indicate
that expansionary policy outcomes seem especially probable in safe democratic districts, where
local liberal elites are least likely to bear costs from illiberal publics. Competitive counties,
rather than starkly Republican ones, are marked by the most restrictive policy environments.
In a finer-grained analysis I explore mechanisms, and discover that Hispanic community
mobilization can oppose restriction where populations are sufficiently large, but only the
absence of electoral pressures for restriction can lead to truly expansionary policies.
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The consensus on what drives immigration policymaking has shifted over the past two decades.
Long characterized as a function of “quiet,” interest group-driven bargaining (Freeman 1995; Ham-
mar 1985), or of the judiciary’s expansion of rights (Joppke 2001; Guirandon 2002), recent work
on immigration policymaking has emphasized “loud” politics: electoral competition on cultural
issues and partisan responsiveness to voter preferences. Given the rising salience of cultural, post-
material issues in political competition (Inglehart 1981), the supremacy of expansionary interest
group pressures in immigration policymaking has been called into question by numerous scholars.
Even theories that emphasize interest group activity as the key driver of policy outcomes recognize
that publics are predominantly illiberal and skeptical of immigration (Freeman 1995; Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014). Electoral theories of policymaking emphasize the politicization of these il-
liberal attitudes through partisan competition, and predict restrictive policy outcomes. If local
or national electorates feel that they are bearing large or disproportionate costs for immigration,
parties or candidates that campaign on restrictive immigration policies, and pursue such policies
once in office, should benefit relative to parties and candidates that pursue quiet, expansionary
policymaking. This creates strong incentives for political leaders to do away with expansionary
policies.
Given that (perceived) costs of immigration are not uniform, and the perception of costs should
drive policy outcomes according to an electoral model of policymaking, recent research on immi-
gration has focused heavily on variation in and determinants of attitudes towards immigration and
immigrants – and whether regional variation in attitudes translates into immigration policy through
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electoral pressures. Of the numerous contextual factors that have been examined, demography is
linked most consistently to attitudes: studies find that large out-group populations – and rapid
growth in out-group populations – are associated with lower trust (Putnam 2007) and restrictive
and exclusionary policy preferences (Enos 2015; Hopkins 2011). However, the link between de-
mography and policy outcome is more tenuous, and rigorous empirical and theoretical work on the
relationship between Hispanic community size and immigration policy begets contradictory results.
In-line with Racial Threat frameworks (or, more accurately, Ethnic Threat frameworks), which
propose that White (or Anglo) populations respond to large or growing outgroup populations with
restrictive or exclusionary policies (Key 1949; Stein, Post, and Rindin 2000; Tolbert and Grummel
2003), larger or growing Hispanic populations have been linked to exclusion and restriction of immi-
gration (Tolbert and Hero 1996; Hopkins 2011). However, other researchers have linked increasing
Hispanic population size to improved descriptive and substantive representation (Mansbridge 1999;
Preuhs 2007) and greater interest group mobilization (Martinez 2011). In this paper, I work to
reconcile the theoretical contradictions of these two models of immigration policymaking. I propose
and test a curvilinear theory of demography and immigration policy, in which Ethnic Threat kicks
in as Hispanic populations become visible, but is counteracted when Hispanic communities are large
enough to be electorally relevant and mobilized.
A second consistent predictor of attitudes towards immigration is ideology. In the US, conserva-
tives view immigrants as more of threat to the economy and national security than liberals (Hussey
and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013). However, recent work points out that American (and European)
electorates are predominantly skeptical of greater immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014;
Money 1999; Freeman 1995), implying that leaders or candidates seeking to appeal to the median
voter have little to gain from expansionary policy positions regardless of their overarching ideologi-
cal position. Money (1999) presents a political demographic model of electoral pressures relating to
immigration policy, in which both regional ideological characteristics and political “safety” are im-
portant. Though left-leaning parties have an incentive to appeal to future electorates and pursue
the inclusion of immigrants, they also face incentives to restrict immigration from immigration-
skeptical left-leaning voters. In short, the politics of immigration control are mediated by the
underlying competitiveness of elections; electoral pressures for restriction abate only in regions
that are heavily liberal, where competing parties are unlikely to derive meaningful electoral gains
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from competing on immigration restriction. In conservative and mixed regions, we should expect
to see restriction.
Using a novel dataset on county-level immigration enforcement policies in the US, I explore
the role of demography and political geography in local immigration enforcement policymaking.
Indeed, I find statistically significant evidence that local immigration enforcement policy becomes
more restrictive where Hispanic populations are large and visible, but also that this restrictive effect
disappears when Hispanic populations are large enough. However this demographic effect is very
small in substantive terms, and contingent on the exclusion of Texan counties from my sample. In
line with Wong (2012), Lewis et al. (2013), and Chavez and Provine (2009), I find that local political
dynamics are far stronger predictors of immigration enforcement policies. Resembling Money’s
(1999) findings, my results indicate that expansionary policy outcomes seem especially probable
in safe democratic districts, where local liberal elites are least likely to bear costs from illiberal
publics. Meanwhile, competitive counties – rather than starkly Republican ones, where electoral
pressures are also reduced – are marked by the most restrictive policy environments. In a finer-
grained, policy-by-policy, analysis I explore the mechanisms, and find that Hispanic community
mobilization can oppose restriction where populations are sufficiently large, but only the absence of
electoral pressures for restriction can lead to truly expansionary policies. These results are robust
to state-level political dynamics that have been found to drive immigration policy outcomes.
1 Theories of Immigration Politics
The study of immigration politics includes a wide variety of policy outcomes that pertain to immi-
grants, asylum-seekers, and refugees, including but not limited to citizenship regimes and national-
ity (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013, 2015; Just and Anderson 2012), labor market restrictions,
discrimination, and opportunity structures (Adida et al. 2016; van Tubergen et al. 2004), access
to social benefits (Sainsbury 2012), immigration enforcement (Wong 2012; Lewis et al. 2013),
and actual immigration policy (Peters 2014, 2015). Broadly speaking, these policy outcomes can
be aggregated into two broader categories of interest: immigration control and immigrant rights
(Tichenor 2002; Boushey and Luedtke 2011). In the following paragraphs I distinguish between
rights (exclusion versus inclusion) and control (restriction versus expansion).
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The first category pertains to rights and benefits granted to newcomers of various stripes.
Given variation in the accessibility of citizenship, the stringency of anti-discrimination legislation,
and generosity of welfare states, scholars have explored what national and sub-national factors
drive policy outcomes. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the policy environment dictating access
to rights and benefits can range from exclusionary to inclusionary. The second broad category of
policy outcomes relates to how governments legislate the movement and presence of migrants. Open
border policies and freedom of movement, immigration quotas and restrictions, and visa programs
mediate the number, and characteristics, of migrants who enter a country. Immigration enforcement
at the border and in the interior further conditions how feasible it is for (undocumented) migrants
to remain and work in the host society. The extent to which policies effect movement and presence
of migrants ranges from restrictive to expansionary.1 In this paper, I limit myself to an exploration
of what drives local leaders to pursue immigration controls, and do not attempt to address the
sources and drivers of immigrants‘ rights. However, given the conflation of the two concepts in
extant theories of immigration policymaking, my subsequent discussion of immigration politics
examines both categories of policy outcomes.
The literature on immigration politics can be divided into two theoretical families. While
some scholars emphasize the nexus between interest groups and elected officials, others find that
policy follows from the responsiveness of parties to (largely illiberal) public opinion. The dominant
models of migration politics in the late 20th century, drawn from Hammar (1985), and formalized
by Freeman (1995), emphasize quiet “client politics” – politics in which interest groups and state
actors decided on immigration policies and immigrant rights legislation.These frameworks gravitate
around the idea that rational state actors, especially elected representatives, mobilize the interests
of those who pay most attention to a given issue. Certain business elites and migrant organization
enjoy concentrated costs from inclusive, expansive policies, while the public experience diffuse costs.
These costs can be fiscal, such as paying taxes for immigrant benefits, or simply the function of
1I make this distinction between policy categories to emphasize that objectives of legislation need not be strictly
pro- or anti-immigrant. A national or subnational government can increase immigration without expanding rights
to immigrants, or severely limit immigration while granting extensive rights to the immigrants who are granted
entrance. Policies that limit access to the welfare state can restrict immigration through the reduction of incentives
to immigrate in the first place. International agreements, such as Schengen, can open borders to more movement
and thereby expand access to rights for specific classes of migrants. In practice, the distinction between control and
rights policy can be blurry – and past research often conflates the two concepts.
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distaste at a growing immigrant community. These costs are indirect and diffuse across an entire
polity, and thus less likely to elicit organizations devoted to curtailing immigration or migrant
rights. Business leaders seeking low-wage immigrant labor, meanwhile, have more of an incentive
to pool resources and mobilize. Elected officials respond to the organized beneficiaries of migration,
and are less accountable to the unorganized public.2
Scholars have accentuated Freeman‘s model by highlighting how interest groups utilize specific
venues and frames to achieve expansionary and inclusionary goals. Guirandon (2002) theorizes that
the most consistent advocates of increased immigration and migrant rights have been courts and
bureaucrats, rather than elected officials. Courts have an interest in consistency, and judges fear
appearing impartial when laws are applied inconsistently across groups. Meanwhile, administrators
and policy writers also have an egalitarian bias: they favor “legalistic solutions that standardize
operation.” Implicit in Guirandon‘s framework is that organized interests take advantage of the
interest and opportunity structures within bureaucracies and the courts to advance their interests.
Joppke (2001) narrows the scope further, and argues that primarily courts, not administrators,
extend rights. Judicial actors recognize that “if liberal-democratic states are faithful to their own
principles, they must either approximate the rights of (long-settled) aliens to those of citizens, or, if
they continue discriminating against aliens, they must make citizenship easily accessible to them.”
Empirical work on the role of interest groups in the politics of immigration control has focused
heavily on the impact of industry lobbying, with mixed results at the national and subnational
level (see for example Rheault 2013; Peters 2014, 2015; Boushey and Luedtke 2011). Why does
Freeman’s model encounter significant empirical headwind, especially sub-nationally? Recent evi-
dence suggests that illiberal publics are more influential than earlier models predicted, and that the
nexus between voters and parties – rather than between interest groups and state actors – drives
policy outcomes with respect to immigration. Rather than stand-by as business leaders, migrant
organizers, and elected officials collude to expand immigration and include migrants into social
benefits programs, parties – especially populist parties – respond to the preferences of illiberal
publics with exclusionary, restrictive policies. In-line with the increasing attention paid to cultural
cleavages in public opinion, and the electoral turn more generally, recent research on immigration
2See Cornelius and Rosenblum (2004) for an excellent, in-depth overview of interest-group and institu-
tional/bureaucratic explanations of immigration policymaking.
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politics predicts that parties will compete for illiberal voters by actively eschewing “quiet” politics
on immigration.
Taken as a whole, the literature indicates that public opinion and attitudes play an important
role in immigration policy outcomes, both through electoral competition and direct democracy.
Perlmutter (1996) integrated electoral competition into theories of immigration politics by high-
lighting that Freeman’s assumption of diffuse and uniform costs of immigration to the public does
not hold, since spatial distribution of immigrant populations is uneven. Immigration, he argued,
should become politicized at the regional or municipal level, in areas with greater immigration –
or simply when voters perceive that they are bearing disproportional costs. European multi-party
systems, the increasing salience of immigration gives populist demarcationist/tan parties an oppor-
tunity for growth (Hooghe and Marks 2009). To woo illiberal voters who perceive both economic
and cultural costs, these parties compete on restrictive and exclusionary platforms, in which im-
migration politics is a high-salience issue. These parties emphasize their stances on the cultural
dimension of competition, which is secondary for established parties across the economic spectrum
(Rovny 2013).
In two party systems, populist parties are limited in their ability to compete for government
positions. Until the 1980s, stances on immigration cut across party lines in the United States. Given
the plurality system, populist could not emerge as in Europe, and immigration was politicized in
the 1980s and 90s along existing party lines, leading to a realignment of voters on an issue that
previously cut across party lines (Monogan and Doctor, 2017; Bowler et al. 2006). Subnational
political dynamics such as Proposition 187 in California proved especially important catalysts of
realignment for Hispanic populations, since they signaled where the two main parties positioned
themselves in an era of electoral immigration politics. In short, recent scholarship on immigration
politics emphasizes an electoral turn, a process that has rendered “quiet politics” impossible.3
3Of course the actual policymaking process is inhibited by path dependent constraints on policymaking, especially
in the domain of social benefits (Pierson 2000; Hansen 2000). The extent to which parties are able to transform
these preferences into policy outcomes is still limited by policy legacies and the continued clout of more conventional
parties, but evidence indicates that numerous democracies are experiencing a dualization of rights courtesy of this
electoral trend (Sainsbury 2012; Sainsbury 2007).
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2 Sources of Electoral Pressure
Interest-group models of immigration policymaking predicted expansionary and, to a lesser extent,
inclusionary policies. Electoral models predict the opposite; given the illiberal nature of the public,
the politicization of immigration benefits those who advocate for greater controls. To discern
under what conditions leaders face electoral pressures to pass these restrictive immigration policies,
much recent scholarship has focused on why voters perceive they are bearing disproportional (or
high) costs from immigration – and whether these attitudinal pressures actually translate into
policy outcomes. Drivers of pressures can be disaggregated into two main families: demographic
and political. Both factors have been linked to attitudes towards out-group members and policy
pressures, but the association between regional political characteristics and policy outcomes is more
consistently robust.
Ideology is consistently linked to attitudes, as well as to immigration policy outcomes, including
immigration enforcement policies. In terms of attitudes, conservatives view immigrants as more
of a threat to the economy, culture, and national security than liberals (Lahav 2013; Hussey and
Pearson-Merkowitz 2013). Studies have also established a robust link between conservative ideology
and restrictive and exclusionary policymaking (Chavez and Provine 2009; Boushey and Luedtke
2011). Wong (2012) even finds that law enforcement in conservative areas is more likely to seek and
implement control policies against undocumented immigrants. Cumulatively, these studies indicate
that elected leaders in conservative districts experience pressures to pass restrictive immigration
enforcement policies.
However, the relationship between policymaking and ideology may not be direct or linear;
evidence suggests that other political factors, including the competitiveness of elections and electoral
systems more generally, conditions the extent to which local ideology leads to pressures on elected
leaders. As already noted, numerous scholars have pointed out an illiberal consensus on immigration
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2011; Freeman 1995). Attitudes towards immigrants are “relatively
negative and constant” (Money 1999, p.207). Even if liberals are less skeptical of immigrants than
conservatives, they are still skeptical of immigration. In other words, the median voter is illiberal on
immigration, reducing incentives for leaders to ever openly pursue expansionary policies – especially
in two party systems.
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In short, there are few electoral pressures for expansionary policy, but plenty of incentives –
expect, possibly, in very liberal regions – for restriction. Indeed, Money (1999) finds evidence, at
the national level in advanced Western democracies, that parties on the left and right are especially
likely to signal restrictive stances and pursue restrictive policies in close electoral races. To be clear,
left-leaning parties do see naturalized immigrants as potential voters, but appeal to these potential
electorates through inclusive stances on integration policy. Aggressive immigration control stances
paired with inclusionary integration policy, then, serve as a signal to electorates in ideologically
mixed regions that parties are tough on immigration but welcoming of newcomers.
The implication of this political-ideological model is that electoral pressures for restrictions
in competitive districts should resemble those in safely conservative ones. In safe liberal districts,
leaders or candidates are unlikely to lose an election as a result of appearing soft on immigration, so
face only pressures from voters that are unlikely to vote for them anyway. Freed from the shackles
of an illiberal public, leaders in such safely liberal (Democratic) regions are free to respond to the
concentrated beneficiaries of immigration – migrant-reliant business and migrant organizations –
since the the benefits outweigh the public opinion costs. Simply put, I posit a curvilinear relation-
ship between local ideology and immigration policy; a restrictive status quo in conservative and
mixed areas, but a strong expansionary effect where liberals make up a dominant majority. Policies
will be most restrictive where politics is loud and competitive, as well as where the electorate is
predominantly conservative.
Hypothesis 1a: Regions with predominantly liberal electorates should be associated with
expansionary immigration policymaking.
Hypothesis 1b: Regions with predominantly conservative as well as mixed electorates should
be associated with similar levels of restriction, in comparison to predominantly liberal regions.
Scholarship on the relationship between race (or ethnicity) and immigration policy is divided on
the implications of demographics for local immigration politics. In other words, numerous streams
of literature indicate that ignoring the role of migrants and their allies in immigration politics risks
missing an important determinant of policy outcomes – albeit for very different reasons.
8
Similar to Racial Threat frameworks derived from analyses of local Black-White political dy-
namics (Key 1949), numerous scholars have demonstrated that Anglo populations respond to large
or growing outgroup populations with restrictive or exclusionary policies (Tolbert and Hero 1996;
Stein, Post, and Rindin 2000; Tolbert and Grummel 2003).4 Concerns about wage-depressing
effects of immigrant labor generates anxiety about immigration among workers in industries or
regions that rely, or could rely, on low-wage immigrant labor (Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter
2001; Fachinni and Mayda 2012). Moreover, scarce or insecure employment opportunities aggravate
competition between groups competing for the same resources (Gay 2006). Parochial preferences
for exclusion follow from this economic threat, and local leaders respond by protecting native labor
by closing off employment to immigrants and restricting immigration.5 Given that the majority of
foreign-born residents in the United States identify as Hispanic, and immigrant- and citizen-status
are invisible, the Ethnic Threat effect is activated by – and maps onto – large Hispanic populations,
rather than specifically (undocumented) immigrant populations.
With some exceptions (Hopkins 2011; Ybarra et al. 2016), the application of the Ethnic Threat
framework yields more consistent results about attitudes than policy outcomes. Evidence suggests
that restrictive and exclusionary policy pressures among Anglos are counteracted when Hispanic
populations are large enough (Tolbert and Hero 1996) because quality of representation of im-
migrant interests improves as the immigrant electorate expands (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005;
Roche and Matsubayashi 2013). Though it is a stretch to assume that Hispanic communities and
leaders automatically pursue the interest of immigrants in their political behavior, there is evidence
that Hispanic political actors advocate on behalf of immigrant communities and interests (Martinez
2011). Moreover, given the prevalence of mixed-status families, expansionary immigration policy
serves as way to reunite families. Where we see greater racial threat we should also see better
descriptive representation (Preuhs 2007). In conjunction, these factors should counteract the re-
strictive public pressures on elected leaders. Public preferences should also be mediated by the
strength and organization of immigrant communities. Where the Hispanic population is larger and
better entrenched, Hispanic voters are more mobilized and better connected to one another in the
4I will refer to the application of out-group threat effect to Hispanic populations as the Ethnic Threat hypothesis
for the remainder of the paper.
5Contact theory, which predicts that contact with out-groups should lead to inclusionary preferences, has found
little empirical support (Enos 2015).
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United States. Moreover, when co-ethnic candidates run for office, which becomes more likely in
regions with a larger Hispanic population, voter turnout among Hispanic is higher (Barretto 2007).
Though large immigrant populations trigger exclusionary policy preferences among natives, elected
leaders will encounter cross-pressures from mobilized and politically active Hispanic communities
who are opposed to the exclusion of immigrants and Hispanics. In a historical overview of na-
tional immigration policymaking in the United States, Goldin (1994) tells a similar story. Despite
restrictive preferences attributable to economic downturns in the early years of the 20th century,
and substantial interest group pressures, naturalized immigrants and their political allies in urban
areas proved capable of resisting national-level quotas and literacy tests for decades, until 1921.
In addition to representation, numerous Hispanic and Immigrant rights organization are active
at the local level, and these groups should mediate the extent to which local elected officials respond
to electorate preferences and attitudes and immigration. (Martinez 2011). The relationship between
Latino advocacy groups and key court cases, such as MALDEF’s role in the 1980 extending K-12
education to undocumented children, is well-established (Olivas 2016). Where Hispanic populations
are larger, such organizations should be more entrenched, organized, and able to mobilize on behalf
of undocumented immigrants – on behalf of expansionary immigration enforcement policies.
The two literatures produce opposite expectations, but are not necessarily contradictory. Where
Hispanic communities are very small, they should be less visible to Anglo electorate and therefore
less likely to elicit restrictive responses via the ethnic threat mechanism. Moreover, a small His-
panic community is less electorally crucial, and therefore elected or campaigning leaders have fewer
incentives to appeal to Hispanic voters. The ethnic threat effect should be strongest where Hispanic
communities are large enough to be visible, but not yet large enough to command attention from
leaders seeking election. Once Hispanic communities surpass a certain proportional threshold, lead-
ers derive more benefits from appealing to the expansionary preferences of Hispanic voters than to
the nativist anxieties of Anglo voters – at which point a “representation effect” sets in. I have weak
priors about thresholds for these respective effects, but work on state-level redistribution indicates
that substantive representation improves when Hispanic population share exceeds 20% of the total
population. Again, I posit a curvilinear relationship between demographics and policy outcomes –
which I model with a polynomial in my subsequent analysis.
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Hypothesis 2a: Where Hispanic populations are large enough to be visible, local leaders will
respond to electoral pressures and pass restrictive immigration policy.
Hypothesis 2b: As Hispanic population share surpasses a certain threshold, substantive rep-
resentation will reverse the racial threat effect and lead to expansionary immigration policy.
3 Scope Conditions
In this paper I am focusing on local politics of restriction and expansion, rather than inclusion
and exclusion. My results should be interpreted under those scope conditions; local politics of
immigrants rights and benefits need not operate according to the same dynamics.
To get leverage on the question of what motivates local governments to legislate migration
flows, I focus on a specific policy domain: immigration enforcement. Immigration enforcement
policy determines the extent to which governments go out of their way to identify, apprehend, and
process undocumented migrants – and is often intended to directly reduce migrant stock as well as
incentives to immigration. Moreover, there is indeed evidence that migrants prefer to stay in more
welcoming enforcement environments, though little consistent evidence that immigrants actually
leave (“self deport” from) exclusionary environments (Rocha, Hawes, Fryar, and Wrinkle 2014).
Immigration enforcement should not limit existing rights or benefits for immigrants who are on
solid legal footing.6 The intensity with which local governments enforce immigration law varies
greatly across subnational governments, both in Europe and the United States. For this reason,
immigration enforcement policy represents a convenient measure of a local government’s preferences
regarding immigration restriction/expansion, since it is divorced from potential preferences relating
to inclusion/exclusion of migrants on solid legal footing.
In the United States, local immigration enforcement policy applies primarily to the behavior
of police officers and ICE agents in county jails, institutions over which county sheriffs have juris-
diction. Almost all county sheriffs are elected, and should therefore be exposed to the mechanism
I aim to test, namely electoral pressures. Metropolitan police departments are usually managed
by appointed police chiefs, and metropolitan police forces make up a large share of the national
6This assumption is somewhat problematic, given the prevalence of mixed-status families in the United States
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police force. However, county sheriffs still operate the county jail in municipalities with metropoli-
tan police departments – so county-level immigration enforcement policy should have an effect on
immigration control even in cities where the county sheriff’s office is dwarfed by a metropolitan
police department such as the NYPD or the LAPD. In other words, the elected officials I focus on
have jurisdiction over immigration enforcement policy across the United States.
Another benefit of focusing on law enforcement policy relates to the limited autonomy of local
governments. Immigration enforcement represent a means by which local governments can actually
expand or restrict immigration through policymaking, or at least attempt to. Immigration policy
is the domain of federal government in the United States. Local actors have no influence over
how many or what types of migrants enter a country through national-level programs. The extent
to which the federal government polices undocumented immigration is also beyond any individual
local government. Control over immigration enforcement empowers local governments to condition
the desirability of an area for existing and potential migrant communities. In addition to physically
removing existing undocumented individuals, restrictive immigration policies provide incentives for
mixed-status families to move elsewhere, and encourage potential migrants to seek out alternative
destinations.
The final and maybe most important reason for focusing on local immigration enforcement
policy is that variation in local policies matters for other political outcomes. Local immigration
enforcement has political externalities; for example, harsher policy environments mobilize Hispanic
turnout (White 2016) and effect Anglo and Hispanic trust in government (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrin-
kle 2015). Even though Jaeger (2016) casts some doubt on whether restrictive local immigration
enforcement policies actually lead to greater de facto restriction – that is, to greater numbers of
apprehensions and deportations – migrant communities and their allies respond to policy environ-
ments. Understanding what drives local policymaking, if not policy enforcement or “success”, can
help us understand political behavior and attitudes more generally.
4 Measuring Local Immigration Enforcement Policy
Local immigration enforcement in the United States involves collaboration or partnership between
local law enforcement and federal agencies, especially Immigration and Customs Enforcement
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(ICE). Local participation in immigration enforcement is voluntary; police forces are under no
legal obligation to aid ICE, and are actually more likely to face legal repercussions for collabora-
tion due to violations of constitutional rights. When considering whether and to what extent they
will collaborate with ICE, police departments and jails face a menu of policy options. The data I
use in my analysis, which comes from the Immigration Legal Resource Center (ILRC),7 measures
the level of institutionalized entanglement between between county-level law enforcement and ICE.
Specifically, the ILRC dataset indicates whether jails or sheriffs had entered into seven different
partnerships between ICE and local law enforcement as of 2016. These seven policies are not ex-
haustive. Police forces and jails have recourse to other forms of partnerships or internal policies,
but these are the seven most common policies (ILRC). Given that reliable data on local policies
is time-consuming and difficult to collect for over 3000 counties, the policy menu outlined below
captures much of the county-level variance in immigration enforcement policy climates. Some of
the policies outlined below are official collaborations between the local and federal agencies, while
others are explicit bans on collaboration made exclusively at the local level. The seven policies are
listed in Table 1, along with their classification in terms of restrictive or expansionary intent. See
the Appendix for a description of these policies, and for greater insight into coding of the dependent
variable.
Policy Option Type
287(g) Restrictive Federal-Local Partnership
ICE Detention Contract Restrictive Federal-Local Partnership
ICE Detainer (or Hold) Noncompliance Expansionary Local Policy Response
ICE Alert Noncompliance Expansionary Local Policy Response
Limitation on ICE in Local Jails Expansionary Local Policy Response
Prohibitions on Status Inquiries Expansionary Local Policy Response
General Prohibition on use of Local Resources Expansionary Local Policy Response
Table 1: Local Policy Menu
For my dependent variable, I construct an additive index from these seven policy options by
dummying out each policy option and summing these binaries. If county law enforcement chooses
to implement an expansionary local policy response, or not implement a restrictive federal-local
partnership, the county receives a value of 1 for that given “policy option.” Conversely, a county
7Gleaned from the DHS through a FOIA request in November 2016
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is coded 0 for a given “policy option” if local law enforcement enters into a restrictive federal-local
partnership or does not implement an expansionary local policy response. As a result, the 8-point
ordered dependent variable is non-negative, with a minimum of 0 (most restrictive) and a maximum
of 7 (least restrictive). Given that there are two restrictive and five expansionary policies, a score
of 2 on the dependent variable represents no deviation in either an expansionary or restrictive
direction.8 For an overview of the ILRC data, see Table 2.9 In subsequent analyses, I assume that
this variable is continuous – indicative of a policy climate that runs from restrictive to expansionary.
Missing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
552 16 96 1858 416 92 75 7 2
Table 2: Counts of Dependent Variable
For a map of my dependent variable, see Figure 1. As should be clear from the map, counties
in Western states are the most expansionary, while Midwestern and Northeastern states are less
restrictive than Southern counties.
5 Explanatory Variables
To test my hypotheses and control for other drivers of immigration policymaking, I collected county-
level political, economic, and demographic data. Unless stated otherwise, the variables outlined
in this section are from 2014. All county-level independent variables are summarized in Table 3.
The demographic data included in my models, including the important Hispanic population share
variable, comes from annual US census estimates. I utilize presidential vote share at the county
level as a proxy for local ideology. Specifically, my measure of liberal ideology is the percentage of
the presidential vote won by Barack Obama in the 2012 presidential elections, which I gather from
Congressional Quarterly data.10 To control for local economic conditions and relative deprivation,
I collected county-level poverty rates and median household income as proxies. These measures
are from Census SAIPE datasets. Since education has been shown to predict attitudes towards
8Though there are of course ways to score a 2 on the DV that involve a mixture of restriction and expansion,
though this is very uncommon. Counties tend to restrict or expand.
9Alaska’s 30 county-equivalent subdivisions are excluded from the sample.
10Some reviewers expressed concern about Table 3 since mean vote share for Obama was 38.25%, or well below
his vote share in the general public. This is because Southern, and to a lesser extent Midwestern, counties are on





































































immigration, I also include the percentage of county’s population with a Bachelor’s degree, derived
from the USDA.
Mean Median Std. Deviation Min Max
Total Pop, 101946.19 25763.50 330205.05 89 10170292
5 yr. Pop. Change (%) 0.53 -0.30 5.13 -17.46 100.44
Percent Hispanic 9.22 4.00 13.65 0.21 95.82
5 yr, Hispanic Pop. Change (%) 24.32 18.12 36.27 -45.51 1150.00
Percent White 85.20 91.87 15.83 6.59 99.15
Percent African American 9.35 2.47 14.49 0.00 84.77
Percent Asian 1.41 0.67 2.60 0.00 42.16
Voteshare for Obama (2012) 38.16 36.81 14.59 3.45 93.39
Median Household Income ($) 38772.10 37321.00 10251.17 3029.00 98245.00
Poverty Rate (%) 16.37 15.50 6.48 2.50 51.00
Percent with a Bachelor’s Degree 20.02 17.90 8.88 2.60 75.10
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: County-Level Variables
In a robustness check I include state-level variables that have been shown to effect immigration
policymaking, including partisan composition in state legislatures and descriptive representation
(Preuhs 2007). These variables, drawn from the National Conference of State Legislatures, are
summarized in Table 4.
Mean Median Std. Deviation Min Max
State Legislators: % Democratic 38.21 36.43 12.70 14.44 88.16
State Legislators: % Latino 3.95 0.76 7.49 0.00 43.75
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: State-Level Variables
6 Sample
The sample in my main analysis includes all counties in the United States for which ILRC data
and covariates are not missing. My analysis also excludes Alaska (no county or county-comparable
districts), as well as Rhode Island and Connecticut (No county-level immigration enforcement, all
relevant laws at the state level) for theoretical reasons. ILRC did not receive, or at least not report,
policy data for any counties in West Virginia and Delaware – so all counties in these states are de
facto excluded from my sample. Finally, the sample excludes Texas for methodological reasons.
The ILRC dataset is missing more than 50% of Texan counties, and includes only counties in the
South of Texas. These counties have large Hispanic populations – all 7 counties in the US with a
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Hispanic population share above 90% are in this subset of Texan counties, for example – and very
restrictive policy environments (possibly due to the proximity to the border). I exclude Texas in
my main analysis to limit the effects of a few influential data points on my results, but provide
an auxilliary analysis in the Appendix that includes Texas. In total, my sample consists of 2378
counties.11
7 Model
In my analysis I fit a multilevel linear model with random intercepts at the state level to my data. I
also fit two additional multilevel models – one in which state-level intercepts are explicitly functions
of state-level predictors of immigration policy, the other with state-level varying slopes – to control
for interactions between county and state level dynamics in local policymaking. Given the number
of clusters (43 in my main analysis), maximum likelihood estimation should provide unbiased
estimates of lower- and higher-level coefficients and uncertainty (Stegmueller 2013). Though my
dependent variable is an 8-level ordered outcome rather than a strictly continuous ones, treating
the dependent variable as continuous is not unreasonable given the number of levels and the peaked
distribution of the data (Jackman 2009). After my main analysis I run a robustness check with an
ordinal logistic model, which begets comparable conclusions.
To test the four Hypotheses, I include linear and squared operationalizations of Hispanic pop-
ulation share and democratic vote share in my model. The inclusion of both linear and squared
terms allows me to model the curvilinear relationships between local ideology and partisanship that
I expect. Hypothesis 1a predicts no relationship between the linear operationalization of Obama’s
vote share and the immigration enforcement policy outcome. However, Hypothesis 1b predicts a
positive and significant relationship between the square of Obama’s vote share and the dependent
variable; whereas elected leaders have little incentive to pass expansionary policies in conservative
in moderate counties, these pressures abate in strongly liberal districts. In other words, the positive
association between liberal ideology and expansionary immigration enforcement policy should be
picked up by the squared term, and not by the linear one. Hypothesis 2a predicts a negative and
significant relationship between the linear operationalization of Hispanic population share. This
11My sample including Texas includes 2498 counties.
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initial “ethnic threat” should dissipate when the Hispanic population share passes a certain thresh-
old, and a representation effect kicks in. In other words, Hypothesis 2b predicts a positive and
significant relationship between the squared operationalization of Hispanic population share and
the immigration enforcement policy outcome.









α0j = γ00 + γ1jState+ ηj (2)
In Model 2, the state level intercept is explicitly also a function of the partisan makeup of
the state legislature and the percentage of the state legislature that identifies as Hispanic. The
State-level means in Model II can be represented as:
α0j = γ00 + γ1jState+ γ2jPartisanship+ γ3jHispanicLegislators+ ηj (3)
Finally, Model 3 is a “cross-level interaction model”, with varying slopes (Stegmueller 2013). I
interact county-level effects with state level policy drivers to take into account the possibility that
state-local political linkages differ across regions.12
8 Results
The results of these three models are presented in Table 5. My subsequent analysis will focus on
Model I, since higher-level variables – in the form of additional predictors for state-level intercepts
or state-level varying slopes – do not greatly improve model fit. A brief look at fit statistics reveals
that Model II has a higher AIC and BIC than Model I, indicating worse fit. Model III has a
12I was not able to write out the notation for this model in LaTeX, unfortunately.
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lower AIC than Model I, indicating better fit with varying slopes, but this improvement is minimal
for the BIC (which punishes model complexity). Model II and III also indicate that state-level
variables do not erase or alter the county-level relationships I am interested in exploring. All four
of my substantively interesting independent variables retain sign and significance across the three
specifications.13
Model 1 lends support to three of my hypotheses (H1a, H2a, and H2b), and generates a some-
what counter-intuitive finding pertaining to H1b. As predicted, the square of Obama’s Vote-share
is positively and significantly related to policy outcomes, indicating that ideology has an espe-
cially expansionary effect at very high values. Restrictive electoral pressures clearly dissipate when
electorates are predominantly liberal. Surprisingly, the linear operationalization of Obama’s county-
level vote share has a negative and significant relationship with policy outcomes, rather than just
a flat or insignificant association, as predicted. This indicates that competitive districts do not
only experience restrictive pressures, but that electoral pressures for restriction are actually more
intense in competitive regions than in “safely” conservative counties.
Cumulatively these results fit my characterization of curvilinear political effects. If measured as
changes in the predicted values, the substantive effects are moderate but robust. The substantive
difference in the predictions between a county with a 50% vote share and two standard deviations
above the 50% threshold (78.3%) is a 0.71 standard deviation increase in the policy outcome vari-
able. For a two standard deviation shift below 50% vote share (to 21.6%), we see only an 0.01
standard deviation increase in the predicted value of the outcome variable – lending support to the
hypothesis that ideologically mixed and predominantly conservative districts do not produce radi-
cally different immigration enforcement policy outcomes in substantive terms. Figure 2 represents
the predicted policy outcome variable across the range of county-level vote share for Obama, with
higher values on the y-axis indicating more expansionary policy environments.14
Consistent with H2a, the linear Hispanic population share variable is negatively and significantly
13In my appendix I include the same models, but fitted to a sample that includes the Texan counties included
in the ILRC data. The findings related to partisanship are robust to the inclusion of Texas, but the demographic
findings are not. Specifically, given the large amount of majority-Hispanic counties in Texas, the relationship loses
its curvilinear shape (and the demographic variables lose their significance)
14I utilized parametric simulation to estimate uncertainty for these predictions. Specifically, I simulated 1000 models
from the VCOV of Model I, generated predicted values for all 1000 models across the range of the Obama vote share
variable (holding all other variables at their mean), and plotted the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile of the predictions at every
value of the variable as the de facto confidence interval.
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I: Base II: State-Level Variables III: Varying Slopes
(Intercept) 2.11∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 1.76∗∗
(0.43) (0.50) (0.41)
Percent Hispanic −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Hispanic Squared 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Voteshare Obama (2012) −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Voteshare Obama (2012) Squared 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Rate (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent with BA 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median HH Income (Log) 0.06 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Change in Hispanic Population (%) −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total Population (Log) 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percent African American −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Asian-American 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
5 Yr. Change in Population (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Democratic Seats in State Leg. (%) 0.01
(0.01)
Hispanic Legislators in State Leg (%) 0.02
(0.01)
State Random Intercepts X X X
AIC 3983.19 3995.23 3952.36
BIC 4069.80 4093.38 4067.84
Log Likelihood -1976.59 -1980.61 -1956.18
Num. obs. 2378 2378 2378
Num. groups: States 43 43 43
Var: State Intercepts 0.52 0.46 1.93
Var: Residual 0.27 0.27 0.27
∗∗∗p < 0, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Statistical models
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Figure 2: Predicted Values of County-Level Immigration Enforcement Policy Outcomes
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Figure 3: Predicted Values of County-Level Immigration Enforcement Policy Outcomes
associated with immigration enforcement policy. As Hispanic population share grows, counties
become more restrictive. Consistent with H2b, the squared term of Hispanic proportion is positively
and significantly related to the outcome variable – indicating that, at higher values, Hispanic
population share begins to enact an expansionary effect on immigration enforcement policy.
Cumulatively, these results support my hypothesis, namely that a representation effect eventu-
ally counteracts the racial threat effect. However, both the threat and representation effects are
small in substantive terms. The predicted values reach their minimum at a Hispanic population
share of 36%. The difference between the predicted value at this minimum is only 0.14 standard
deviations below the predicted value of the outcome in a county with the mean Hispanic population
share (7.3%), and 0.21 standard deviations below the predicted value in a county with no Hispanic
residents. The representation effect where Hispanics make up a large share of the population is
more sizable. The difference between the nadir of the prediction at 36% and the county in the
sample with the highest share of Hispanic residents (at 82.7%) is a 0.36 standard deviation increase
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in the predicted values. This relationship between Hispanic population share and predicted values
is represented graphically in Figure 3.
9 Policy-by-Policy Analysis
A closer look at the individual policies that constitute the 8-point policy outcome variable in my
main analysis provides finer-grained insight into demographic and political effects, largely in support
of my hypotheses. Specifically, a policy-by-policy provides leverage on the conditions under which
demographics and political factors matter. The results of the subsequent analysis indicate that
political factors drive expansionary policymaking, while demographic factors influence restrictive
policymaking.
In this section, I disaggregate my eight-point outcome variable into its seven constituent policy
components. I code each of these seven policies as dummies – so that a 1 indicates that a policy
has been adopted – and classify the policy as either a Restrictive Partnership between ICE and
law enforcement or an Expansionary Policy response.15 These policy variables are summarized in
Table 6. For the same sample as in my main analysis, I run separate logistic regressions on each
of the policy outcomes, and – in separate tables – provide the results for models of expansionary
policy outcomes (Table 7) and restrictive policy outcomes (Table 8). In formal terms, the model
used for all seven models resembles Model I in the main analysis, in a logistic form given its binary
outcomes.
Policy Name Policy Type Active Policy No Policy
287(g) Restrictive 27 2371
ICE Detention Contract Restrictive 135 2263
ICE Hold Noncompliance Expansionary 597 1801
ICE Alert Noncompliance Expansionary 139 2259
Limitation on ICE in Jails Expansionary 73 2325
Prohibition on Status Inquiries Expansionary 27 2371
General Prohibition on Use of Resources Expansionary 53 2345
Table 6: Counts of Active County-Level Policies in 2016
Hypotheses H1a and H1b, about political geography and policy outcomes, predict that pre-
dominantly liberal regions should be much more expansionary than predominantly conservative
15See Table 1 above and the coding scheme in the Appendix for an overview of the policies and how they were
coded.
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No Holds No Alerts Jail limits Status Prohib Gen Prohib
Intercept −7.52∗∗ −7.50∗ −36.84∗ −26.23 −15.79
(2.88) (3.64) (18.08) (18.87) (14.97)
Percent Hispanic (%) −0.03 0.04 −0.00 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Percent Hispanic Squared 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Obama Voteshare (%) −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.14 −0.27 −0.29
(0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.20) (0.25)
Obama Votshare Squared 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Rate (%) 0.01 −0.00 0.03 0.07 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Percent with BA (%) 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Median HH Income (Log) 0.25 0.37 2.19 0.92 0.41
(0.24) (0.32) (1.61) (1.64) (1.30)
5 Yr. Hispanic Pop Change (%) −0.00 −0.00 −0.11 −0.03 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.01)
Total Population (Log) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.01 0.31 0.50 0.26
(0.10) (0.12) (0.38) (0.49) (0.47)
Percent African American (%) 0.57 −0.00 4.25 −0.93 −3.33
(1.45) (1.82) (4.64) (5.30) (6.76)
Percent Asian (%) −1.34 −8.65∗ 4.04 6.81 8.78
(5.22) (4.14) (10.13) (10.65) (10.04)
5 Yr. Total Population Change (%) −0.01 0.04 0.09 −0.04 −0.25
(0.02) (0.04) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19)
AIC 1119.55 691.71 121.58 97.07 88.60
BIC 1200.50 772.67 202.53 178.03 169.55
Log Likelihood -545.77 -331.86 -46.79 -34.54 -30.30
Num. obs. 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398
Num. groups: States 44 44 44 44 44
Var: States(Intercept) 16.61 6.63 21.49 29.28 51.69
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 7: Logistic Models of Expansionary Policy Outcomes
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287g ICE Detention Contracts
Intercept −20.06∗∗ −8.35∗∗
(6.13) (3.13)
Percent Hispanic (%) 0.20∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.03)
Percent Hispanic Squared −0.00∗ −0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Obama Voteshare (%) 0.06 0.01
(0.13) (0.10)
Obama Votshare Squared −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Rate (%) −0.02 −0.01
(0.06) (0.02)
Percent with BA (%) 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.01)
Median HH Income (Log) 0.05 −0.00
(0.44) (0.21)
5 Yr. Hispanic Pop Change (%) −0.03 −0.01
(0.04) (0.01)
Total Population (Log) 1.17∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.11)
Percent African American (%) 5.42 −0.80
(3.04) (1.06)
Percent Asian (%) 0.55 −3.83
(7.74) (4.16)




Log Likelihood -92.44 -460.34
Num. obs. 2398 2398
Num. groups: States 44 44
Var: States (Intercept) 0.63 0.00
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 8: Logistic Models of Restrictive Policy Outcomes
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and mixed regions – but that mixed and predominantly conservative regions should not greatly
differ from one another in terms of policy outcomes. Elites in competitive districts mobilize their
electorate (who are predominantly illiberal on immigration) by taking on restrictive policy positions
similar to ones we might see in starkly conservative areas; this restrictive positioning to capture
the median voter absent in liberal regions. In practical terms, we should see a strong association
between the square of Obama’s vote share and expansionary policymaking. Since pressures for
restriction should not vary across ideological profile, we should see no political effects for the re-
strictive policies. Table 7, which models expansionary policy outcomes, provides some evidence
for this: three of the five expansionary policies are positively and significantly associated with the
squared vote share term. As in the main analysis, the linear term is negatively associated with
expansion, but only significant for two of the outcomes. For restrictive policy outcomes, in Table
8, we see little evidence that local ideology makes a difference – neither operationalization of the
Obama vote share variable seems to drive outcomes. This lends further support to H1a and H2a:
electoral pressures for restriction are largely comparable in all but the most liberal regions, where
leaders actively pursue expansionary policies.
Whereas local political factors make a difference for expansion, demography has more bite
when it comes to explaining restriction. H2a and H2b predict a curvilinear relationship between
Hispanic population share and policy outcomes, where increasing population size leads to ethnic
threat and restriction, until population share is large enough to counter these restrictive pressures.
My analysis finds evidence of this effect, but only when it comes to pressures for and against
restriction. Hispanic population share and Hispanic population share squared do not provide any
leverage when it comes to explaining expansionary policies, as seen in Table 7. Coefficients are
insignificant for both variables across all five models. This indicates that pressures from within
the Hispanic community – or electoral responsiveness to these communities – are nonexistent, or
insufficient to drive local policy outcomes. The story is very different for restrictive policies. In
Table 8, in which I model two restrictive policy outcomes, we see that demography is related to
outcomes in the predicted way (and significant for both variables in both models). The linear
term is positive and significant, indicating that larger Hispanic populations create pressures for
restriction. Meanwhile, the squared term is negative and significant, demonstrating that – beyond
a certain threshold – Hispanic communities can resist these restrictive pressures.
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This policy-by-policy analysis provides greater insight into the conditions under which political
and demographic factors affect immigration enforcement policymaking. Specifically, the analysis
highlights what types of policies the two forces act upon. Political factors are best at explain-
ing expansionary policies. As predicted, expansionary policies emerge in predominantly liberal
districts. Meanwhile, the politics of immigration restriction are greatly effected by demography.
Restrictive policies occur where Hispanic populations are large enough for ethnic threat to emerge
– but these restrictive pressures are counteracted when Hispanic populations are large enough to
mobilize against them. In summary, Hispanic community mobilization can oppose restriction where
populations are sufficiently large, but only the absence of electoral pressures for restriction can lead
to truly expansionary policies.
10 Robustness Check
In my main analysis I treat the outcome as linear and continuous given the number of levels and
the peaked distribution of the data; however, an ordinal logistic regression is likely also appropri-
ate, given the discrete nature of the data. To test whether the assumption of continuity is driving
findings, I run a multilevel ordered logistic regression on the same data as in the analysis, again
with random intercepts at the state level. The results of the model are displayed in Table 10 in
the Appendix, and largely corroborate my findings in the main analysis. For the four indepen-
dent variables of interest, the only noteworthy difference is that Hispanic Proportion Squared is
positively associated with the outcome variable only at the 0.1 level of significance, rather than
at the 0.05 level, as in the main analysis. Though this raises some doubts about the robustness
of the “representation effect,” the relationships between immigration enforcement policy and local
political and demographic contexts largely remain the same in an ordered logistic model.
Given missing outcome and explanatory variable data, casewise deletion of counties in my
analysis reduces my sample by about one sixth. Most of this missingness is concentrated in the
dependent variable, in the ILRC data’s policy outcome. Casewise deletion of observation missing
not completely at random is almost certain to introduce bias into results. I rerun my analysis with
multiply imputed data. Specifically, I impute 5 datasets using random forest imputation for all
of my explanatory variables, which has been shown to improve efficiency of parameter estimates
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(Shah et al. 2014). For the dependent variable I utilize a polytomous logistic regression method,
which is more suitable for imputation of ordered categorical variables.
I fit a multilevel model (the same specification as Model I in the main analysis) to each of these
five imputed datasets, then pool the results from these models to capture the average relationships
across these models. The results, presented in Table 11, lend further support to H1a and H1b, but
cast doubt on the findings about demographic electoral pressures. Whereas vote share and vote
share squared do not change sign or significance in the robustness check, the Hispanic population
share variables lose significance in the imputed data (though they retain the same direction of
association).16
11 Conclusion
Existing work suggests that, in the United States, elected leaders face pressures to restrict immi-
gration when Hispanic populations are large enough to be visible, and when they fear competition
from parties or leaders that could position themselves as “tougher on immigration.” Conversely,
these pressures should abate when Hispanic populations become large enough to win elected offices,
effectively mobilize through interest group activity, and effect electoral outcomes more generally.
Additionally, leaders should face less pressures for restriction in predominantly liberal districts,
where tougher on stances on immigration are unlikely to greatly increase the odds of electoral
success.
My analysis finds evidence of these patterns in county-level immigration enforcement policymak-
ing. My policy-by-policy analysis adds some nuance, demonstrating that demographic pressures
act on restrictive policies and political factors explain expansion. Ethnic threat leads to restric-
tion, but large-enough Hispanic populations can cancel out these pressures; true expansion can
only occur when the underlying electorate predominantly liberal. Given the low rates of voter
turnout in local elections, especially for positions such as county sheriffs, the results that I find are
surprisingly strong. In line with the literature on immigration enforcement in the United States,
I find evidence of electoral pressures surrounding immigration policymaking even in low-salience
local politics. Though interest-group accounts of immigration policymaking should have the most
16Given the consistency of results across models without data imputation, I am inclined attribute the non-results
to polytomous imputation of the outcome variable.
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bite where politicization of immigration is low, one must wonder where immigration is not salient
enough for such interest group mechanisms to kick in if electoral pressures help explain outcomes
even at the county-level.
Given these findings about local elections, a reasonable next step would involve taking into
account local political participation, such as participation rates and the ethnic makeup and parti-
sanship of local governments (including Sheriffs). Are higher turnout or lower turnout races more
likely to politicize immigration control, and does the candidate matter? Exploring linkages (and
divisions) between naturalized Hispanic populations and recent immigrant communities also offers
a new direction. Under what conditions do local Hispanic communities or leaders feel that they
need to protect undocumented, not-yet-naturalized, or mixed-status families? How does partisan-
ship and demography interact? A final direction would involve disentangling the role of local-level
interest group pressures from electoral pressures for expansion in liberal districts. The research
design in this paper is able to show that leaders in predominantly liberal districts do not experi-
ence comparable pressures for restriction, but not whether expansionary policy outcomes are the
function of popular pressures for greater immigration or the results of interest groups capitalizing
on the absence of restrictive pressures.
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12 Appendix
12.1 Coding the Dependent Variable
See the list below for a description of the 7 policies17:
1. ICE Hold Noncompliance: An ICE Hold is a request from ICE to a local jail or law
enforcement agency to hold a person, after they should be released, for additional time to
allow ICE to come take custody. Some departments have a policy of not complying with
these Holds (at least under specific conditions, usually non-felony offenses)
Coding if Policy is adopted: 1
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 0
2. 287(g): The 287(g) program specifically deputizes certain law enforcement agents to enforce
immigration laws. All costs of this work fall on the city or county.
Coding if Policy is adopted: 0
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 1
3. ICE Detention Contract: An ICE Detention Contract is a contract between ICE and a
local jail where ICE pays jails to hold immigrants in detention during deportation proceedings.
Coding if Policy is adopted: 0
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 1
4. ICE Alert Noncompliance: An ICE Alert, a type of ICE detainer sometimes called an
ICE notification request, is a request from ICE to be alerted when a person is scheduled to be
released from custody, so that ICE knows by when they need to be taken into custody.Some
departments have a policy of not complying with these Alerts (at least under specific condi-
tions, usually non-felony offenses).
Coding if Policy is adopted: 1
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 0
17I draw heavily from the “County Policy Rubric” Table on page 5 of ILRC (2016) for the descriptions of the
policies
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5. Limits on ICE in Local Jails: Some communities do not allow ICE into the secured area
of local jails without a warrant, or enact procedural protections for immigrants in the jail so
that they can refuse to be interrogated by ICE agents
Coding if Policy is adopted: 1
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 0
6. Prohibitions on Inquiries into Immigration Status and Place of Birth: Some jails
and law enforcement agencies prohibit their officers and employees from inquiring into immi-
gration status or place of birth.
Coding if Policy is adopted: 1
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 0
7. General Prohibition on Use of Resources to Assist Immigration Enforcement:
Some jurisdictions enact general policies to prohibit the use of local resources in assisting with
immigration enforcement. Often they also specifically prohibit local officers from participating
in joint patrols with ICE.
Coding if Policy is adopted: 1
Coding if Policy is not adopted: 0
The final dependent variable is an additive index, in which the outcomes of the seven binary
coding decisions are added together as follows.
PolicyTotal = Policy1 + Policy2 + Policy3 + Policy4 + Policy5 + Policy6 + Policy7 (4)
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12.2 Analysis: Including Texas
I: Base II: State-Level Variables III: Varying Slopes
(Intercept) 2.09∗∗ 1.51∗∗ 1.97∗∗
(0.41) (0.48) (0.40)
Percent Hispanic −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Hispanic Squared −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Voteshare Obama (2012) −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Voteshare Obama (2012) Squared 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Rate (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent with BA 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median HH Income (Log) 0.06 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Change in Hispanic Population (%) −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total Population (%) −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percent African American −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Asian American 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
5 Yr. Change in Population (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Democratic Seats in State Leg. (%) 0.01
(0.01)
Hispanic Legislators in State Leg. (%) 0.02
(0.01)
State Random Intercepts X X X
AIC 4103.09 4115.24 4102.08
BIC 4190.44 4214.23 4218.54
Log Likelihood -2036.55 -2040.62 -2031.04
Num. obs. 2498 2498 2498
Num. groups: States 44 44 44
Var: State Intercepts 0.52 0.46 0.03
Var: Residual 0.26 0.26 0.26
∗∗∗p < 0, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 9: Linear Multilevel Model: Including Texas
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12.3 Ordered Logistic Model
Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic P-Value
Percent Hispanic -.036** .018 -1.99 .047
Percent Hispanic Squared .000* .000 1.66 .098
Voteshare Obama (2012) -.085*** .021 -3.99 .000
Voteshare Obama (2012) Squared .001*** .000 4.92 .000
Poverty Rates (%) .008 .010 .740 .462
Percent with BA .003 .009 .310 .755
Median HH Income (Log) .311* .174 1.79 .074
5 Yr. Hispanic Pop Change -.002 .002 -.99 .322
Total Population (Log) -.047 .064 -.730 .463
Percent African American -.002 .008 -.280 .781
Percent Asian -.016 .029 -.550 .585
Population Change .004 .016 .220 .829
State Random Intercepts X
N 2378
Table 10: Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Regression
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12.4 Imputed Data
Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic P-Value
Intercept 2.988*** 0.433 6.894 0.000
Percent Hispanic -0.002 0.006 -0.343 0.366
Percent Hispanic Squared 0.000 0.000 0.420 0.337
Voteshare Obama 2012 -0.019*** 0.006 -3.156 0.001
Voteshare Obama (2012) Squared 0.000*** 0.000 4.271 0.000
Poverty Rates 0.003* 0.002 1.398 0.081
Percent with BA 0.002 0.002 0.884 0.188
Median HH Income (log) 0.068** 0.039 1.765 0.039
5 Yr. Hispanic Pop Growth -0.000 0.000 -0.104 0.459
Total Population (Log) -0.012 0.016 0.759 0.224
Percent African American -0.292** 0.153 -1.900 0.029
Percent Asian American 0.107 0.704 0.152 0.439
Total Population Change 0.000 0.003 0.105 0.458
State Random Intercepts X
N 2848
Table 11: Linear Multilevel Model: Imputed Data
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